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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Guardiola timely appeals from the district court's order denying his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. On appeal, Mr. Guardiola argues that
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection when it refused
to augment the record with various transcripts he requested be added to the record on
appeal. Additionally, Mr. Guardiola argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Guardiola drank three beers (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.3.) He then started driving and was eating a bag of chips. (PSI, p.3.) The bag
of chips fell to the floor of the car and Mr. Guardiola bent over to pick them up. (PSI,
p.3.)

Mr. Guardiola rear ended a car which was turning.

(PSI, pp.2-3.) The police

officer that initially arrived at the scene did not smell any alcohol on Mr. Guardiola's
breath. (PSI, p.2.) However, Mr. Guardiola consented to a blood test which indicated
that his BAC was .09. (PSI, p.2.) The victims suffered serious injuries and their medical
bills totaled $18,716.35. (R., p.53; PSI, pp.1-3.)
Mr. Guardiola was charged, by information, with aggravated driving under the
influence of alcohol. (R., pp.21-22.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement,
Mr. Guardiola pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. (R., pp.35-39.) The district court
accepted the plea agreement and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed, but suspended that sentence and placed Mr. Guardiola on probation.
(R., pp.48-51.)
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After a period of probation, the State filed a petition for probation violation
alleging that Mr. Guardiola violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.73-74.)

Mr. Guardiola admitted to violating the terms of his probation by driving without a valid
driver's license, changing his residence without permission, failing to maintain
employment, failing to pay restitution, and failing to pay court ordered fees. (R., pp.7577, 88.) The district court revoked and reinstated Mr. Guardiola's probation. (R., pp.9293.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a petition for probation violation
alleging that Mr. Guardiola violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.98-99.)

Mr. Guardiola admitted to violating the terms of his probation by failing to submit
monthly reports to his probation officer, failing to make monthly restitution payments,
and failing to make monthly fee payments.

(R., pp.100-101, 124-126.) The district

court revoked and reinstated Mr. Guardiola's probation. (R., pp.127-132.)
After a third period of probation, the State filed a petition for probation violation
alleging that Mr. Guardiola violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.141-142.)

Mr. Guardiola admitted to violating the terms of his probation for changing his residence
without permission, failing to submit monthly reports to his probation officer, working out
of state without permission, and failing to make restitution payments.
145, 174-177.)

(R., pp.143-

The district court revoked probation and executed the underlying

sentence. (R., pp.178-180, 187-188.)
Mr. Guardiola filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by
the district court.

(R., pp.182-183, 203-212.)

(R., pp.213-215.)
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Mr. Guardiola timely appealed.

On appeal, Mr. Guardiola filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected in part to Mr. Guardiola's
request for the transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the

Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion
to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying
Mr. Guardiola's request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on April 4,
2005, the sentencing hearing held on June 6, 2005, the evidentiary/dispositional hearing
held on May 21, 2007, the evidentiary hearing held on November 22, 2010, and the
dispositional hearing held on December 15, 2010. (Order, Denying Motion to Augment
and Suspend the Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice (hereinafter, Order Denying
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Guardiola due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for
review of the issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35
motion requesting leniency?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Guardiola Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The
Issues On Appeal
A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Guardiola's request for
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on April 4, 2005, the sentencing hearing
held on June 6, 2005, the evidentiary/dispositional hearing held on May 21, 2007, the
evidentiary hearing held on November 22, 2010, and the dispositional hearing held on
December 15, 2010.

(Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

On appeal,

Mr. Guardiola is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for
transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on June 6, 2005, the evidentiary/dispositional
hearing held on May 21, 2007, and the dispositional hearing held on December 15,
2010. 1 Mr. Guardiola asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of

1

Judge Dennis E. Goff presided over the change of plea hearing held on April 4, 2005,
and the evidentiary hearing held on November 22, 2010 (R., pp.35, 124.) However,
Judge Juneal C. Kerrick presided over all of the other hearings in this matter and
entered the order being challenged on this appeal. As such, Mr. Guardiola is not
5

whether the district court abused its discretion when denied his Rule 35 motion because
the applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent
review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's
sentencing decisions.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his

request.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Guardiola With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Hirn Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art.

I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Deparlment of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant

challenging the denial of his request for change of plea hearing held on April 4, 2005,
and the evidentiary hearing held on November 22, 2010, on appeal.
6

transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a).
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to

be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) motion is an appeal as
of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891
(Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule
35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR. 11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous.

7

The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
8

Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
9

appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Guardiola's Appeal Because He
Is Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review.
10

"In

examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing . . . . " State v.

Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App.
2009); State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Where an appeal is taken
from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35, [the appellate court's]
scope of review includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and
at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce."). In other words, an appellate
court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an independent review of
the entire record to determine if the record supports the district court's sentencing
decisions.
In this case, Judge Kerrick denied the Rule 35 motion being challenged on
appeal.

(R., pp.203-211.)

Judge Kerrick also presided over the sentencing hearing

held on June 6, 2005, the evidentiary/dispositional hearing held on May 21, 2007, and
the dispositional hearing held on December 15, 2010.

(R., pp.40, 87, 127.)

Since

Hanington, supra, indicates that an appellate court will review the entire record before
the district court and the Adams Opinion, infra, indicates that an appellate court will
presume Judge Kerrick relied on her memory of those proceedings when she denied
Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35 motion, the transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for
an appellate court to review the merits of his appellate sentencing claim.
The Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v. Brunet, 2013 Opinion
No.108 (November 13, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending), which addressed the
scope of review of an appeal filed from an order revoking probation, wherein the
appellant argued that his sentence was excessively harsh.

In that case, the Idaho

Supreme Court determined that the defendant had not demonstrated a colorable need
11

for the requested transcripts, and so, held there was no violation of the defendant's
rights by denying him copies of the transcripts. Brunet, 2013 Opinion No.108, pp.4-6.
However, the Court did not change any of the pre-existing standards governing what
transcripts are necessary for appellate review. See generally id. In fact, it reaffirmed
the standard discussed in Pierce - that where the length of the sentence is at issue, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the entire record available to the
district court. Id. at 5. At best, the Brunet Opinion provides no guidance for determining
whether requested transcripts are necessary to address merits of sentencing related
issues. At worst, Brunet contravenes United States Supreme Court authority and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,

153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
12

that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

This case has provided no more guidance

than Brunet because it also holds that all the information known to the district court is
relevant, but failed to provide and explanation of the circumstances under which
transcripts of the prior proceedings will or will not be necessary to address sentencing
issues on appeal.
The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed the order
revoking probation, and here Mr. Guardiola is challenging the length of his sentence,
which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the

2

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was

13

requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the district court
denied Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35 motion is not germane to the question of whether the
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal was filed.

Rather, the court is entitled to utilize

knowledge gained from its own official position and observations.

See Downing v.

State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see a/so State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,

907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in
part, upon what the court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within its judicial district and the

filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Guardiola recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals
has recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013
Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Mr. Guardiola disagrees with
the holding in that case.
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quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it denied
Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35 motion.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court
of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[WJhen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a the denial of a Rule 35 motion after a
period of probation, the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events
15

which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.
presumed

the judge would

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

automatically consider prejudgment events when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not, is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings
when it makes sentencing determination after revoking probation.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme court's decision to deny Mr. Guardiola access to those transcripts
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be
dismissed without the transcript.

Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81.

Similarly, in Idaho, an

appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, .... and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872,

873 (Ct. App. 1985).

If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court
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minutes that may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is
possible, then the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of
Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court
minutes to provide ... [a) record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho
489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Guardiola fails to provide the appellate court with

transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Guardiola's sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is
state action, combined with Mr. Guardiola's indigency, which prevents him from access
to the necessary transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and
due process clauses and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. Guardiola
was first given the opportunity of multiple periods of probation, the district court must
have found that the circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member
of society. To ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings
presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Guardiola.

Denial of access to the

requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Guardiola from addressing those positive
factors in support of his appellate sentencing claims.

In light of that denial,

Mr. Guardiola argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should be
presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are
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necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 3 ; to the
contrary, the question on appeal is whether the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision.

D.

The Idaho Supreme Court. By Failing To Provide Mr. Guardiola With Access To
The Requested Transcripts. Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
3
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Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Guardiola has not
obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
Standards 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
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sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Guardiola
on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Guardiola is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Guardiola his constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of
that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency

A.

The Doctrine Of Invited Error Does Not Preclude Mr. Guardiola From Challenging
The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion On Appeal
Mr. Guardiola recognizes that he entered into a binding Rule 11 agreement and

stipulated to the length of his sentence when it was originally imposed. (R., pp.35-39,
48-51.)

The doctrine of invited error generally precludes a party from requesting a

specific ruling from a trial court and then challenging that ruling on appeal.

State v.

Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402 (Ct. App. 2000). Despite the doctrine of invited error, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a defendant can obtain a sentence reduction
pursuant to a Rule 35 motion after a stipulated sentence has been imposed. State v.

Person, 145 Idaho 293, 299 (Ct. App. 2007). In order to obtain a sentence reduction
after the imposition of a stipulated sentence:
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[A] defendant requesting reduction of a stipulated sentence must show
that his motion is based upon unforeseen events that occurred after entry
of his guilty plea or new information that was not available and could not,
by reasonable diligence, have been obtained by the defendant before he
pied guilty pursuant to the agreement. The defendant must also show that
these unanticipated developments are of such consequence as to render
the agreed sentence plainly unjust.
Id. (citations omitted).

As such, the doctrine of invited error does not preclude a defendant from filing a
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency after receiving a stipulated sentence, so long as the
defendant provides new information, the consequences of which render the agreed
sentence plainly unjust.

Mr. Guardiola argues that the new information provided in

Section ll(B), infra, meets the foregoing standard.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Guardiola's Rule 35
Motion Requesting Leniency
Mr. Guardiola asserts that the unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed,

is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed is unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested
leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable."

Id.

"If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the

defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information
presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
21

giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Guardiola does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Guardiola must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.
objectives of criminal punishment are:

Id.

The governing criteria or

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
Mr. Guardiola provided new information in support of his Rule 35 motion.
Specifically, Mr. Guardiola was diagnosed with a heart condition called WolffParkinson-White syndrome, which results in a disruption of the electrical currents in the
heart. (R., pp.195-202.) Mr. Guardiola argued that his sentence should be reduced so
that he might have access to medical treatment for his condition in the community. (R.,
p.210.) This is a serious condition and complications with medical treatments could
result in the need of a pacemaker or possibly death.

(R., p.202.)

Mr. Guardiola presented new information in support of his Rule 35 motion.
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As such,

There are additional mitigating factors which support the conclusion that
Mr. Guardiola's sentence is excessively harsh.

Specifically, Mr. Guardiola's family

support is a mitigating factor. Mr. Guardiola has a good relationship with his mother and
with his five siblings. (PSI, p.6.) At the time of sentencing, Mr. Guardiola had a stable
relationship with his wife and children.

(Alcohol-Drug Evaluation Report attached to

PSI, p.1.)
Additionally, Mr. Guardiola's employment history is mitigating.
earned his GED.
employment history.

(PSI, p.8.)

Mr. Guardiola

Prior to sentencing, Mr. Guardiola had a steady
Mr. Guardiola maintained employment with the

(PSI, pp.8-9.)

same employer for approximately nine years. (Alcohol-Drug Evaluation Report attached
to PSI, p.4.) Prior to sentencing, Mr. Guardiola did not have any financial problems.
(Alcohol-Drug Evaluation Report attached to PSI, p.4.) While on his most recent period
of probation, Mr. Guardiola lost an employment opportunity in Idaho so he got a job in
Utah.

(11/19/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.4-8.)

Mr. Guardiola then had a heart attack which has

caused him long term health problems. (11/19/12 Tr., p.4, LS.9-12.)

While he was in

custody for his most recent probation violations he continued to work and completed the
sheriff's programming twice. (11/19/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-19.)
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Guardiola participated in a substance addiction
evaluation which concluded that he was not addicted to alcohol. (Alcohol-Drug
Evaluation Report attached to PSI, p.1.) In fact, the original presentence investigator
recommended probation. (PSI, p.11.)
In sum, when Mr. Guardiola's new medical condition is considered in light of the
other mitigating factors present in this matter, it supports the conclusion that
Mr. Guardiola's sentence is excessively harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Guardiola respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments
which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Guardiola
requests that the fixed portion of his sentence be reduced. Alternatively, Mr. Guardiola
respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1th day of January, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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